At the Fujimori Trial: General Julio Salazar Monroe--June 25, 2008

On Wednesday June 25, Cesar Nagasaki led the three judges of the tribunal and the observers through a dry and quite repetitive series of questions interrogating the ex-director of the SIN (National System of Intelligence), Julio Salazar Monroe, who himself also happens to be a client of Nagasaki. Most of the words that escaped the mouth of Salazar were unsurprising since his interrogator already included the desired answer in the query or utilized a method of closed interrogation.

Some of the central points Nagasaki was attempting to repetitively reinforce included the following:
1. The presence of a channel of information and the absence of a chain of command.
2. The distinction between two types of strategic information: administrative and operational.
3. Functions of the police, the military and intelligence officials are separate and distinct.
4. Isolate Vladimiro Montesinos as an individual who acted outside of his functions at the SIN.
5. Salazar denied having any knowledge of the Barrios Altos or the Cantuta massacre, much less of Grupo Colina or other activities of Montesinos.

According to Salazar, the intelligence sector had a limited non-militaristic scope which included economic, political and psycho-social issues. The data was circulated through a channel of communication, where the final reports only produced administrative strategic intelligence. The characteristics of the data pertaining to the SIN were described as entirely distinct from operational or military intelligence—which would necessitate a chain of command. Throughout Nagasaki’s overall line of questioning the bureaucratic sectors of the police, intelligence and military were constructed to demonstrate their independence and functional differences.

The relationship between Alberto Fujimori, Julio Salazar and Vladimiro Montesinos was also restructured to emphasize a certain distance among the three, this of course did not uphold among the Peruvians who had witnessed multiple exchanges between these individuals. Subsequent to this explanation, Salazar denied any and all knowledge of the planning of Barrios Altos or the Cantuta massacres and of course the infamous Grupo Colina. Salazar revokes the testimony of others like Martín Rivas in Ojo por Ojo of Umberto Jara, that specifically implicates him with the Grupo Colina and their operational strategies to liquidate ‘subversive’ sectors of the population.

--Michelle Doherty